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The Development of Competitive Industries: The Role of 
State Government Actors 
 
Introduction. 
Since the 1970s, the onrush of globalisation in Australia’s markets has presented 
significant economic policy challenges to the country’s federal and state 
governments (Everett, 2002; Goldfinch, 1999).  A major challenge for Australian 
legislators was (and remains) making a nation previously protected by a 
‘fortress’ of tariffs and subsidies more productive and competitive in world 
markets (Brown, 2000; Edwards, 2002; Martin, 2000).  One theoretical 
framework that achieved prominence in Australian economic policy development 
in the 1990s, largely due to its intuitive appeal and apparent value in increasing 
the competitive advantage of nations, is Porter’s (1990) Industrial Cluster Theory 
(ICT) (Boddy, 2000).  In The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter argued 
that for a modern economy to advance within a globalised marketplace, it needed 
to foster innovative industries able to compete successfully on an international 
scale.  In order to best achieve this, Porter argued that governments needed to 
recognise and facilitate the growth of innovative industry ‘clusters’, particularly 
those enjoying some level of local advantage that could not be readily imitated 
elsewhere.  In Australia, acceptance of this belief was expressed in the federal 
government’s manufacturing reports, which introduced Porter’s notion of 
industrial cluster development into government policy by proposing the 
development of regional industry partnerships that strengthened networks, 
encouraged innovation, and the inter-firm transfer of technology (Australian 
Manufacturing Council, 1994; Bureau of Industry Economics, 1991).   
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In addition to this, in 1993, a federal government investigation into the 
requirements of a sustainable economic development strategy for the nation 
highlighted the need for Australia’s regional economies to similarly optimise 
their economic productivity by developing their localised advantages (Keating, 
1994; Kelty, 1993).  This was followed by the McKinsey Report ‘Lead Local, 
Compete Global’ (McKinsey & Company, 1994) which was the first report to 
suggest that ICT was an appropriate basis upon which to develop Australia’s 
regional economies to internationally competitive standards.  Given the level of 
investigation and documentation undertaken, it is apparent that successive 
Australian governments believed the conditions leading to the formation of 
internationally competitive ‘wealth-generating’ industry clusters (such as the 
internationally renown ‘Silicon Valley’ in the United States) could simply be 
replicated to help foster the inception and growth of new Australian industries, 
and to re-engineer older ones to world standards (Ivarsson, 1999).  
 
Despite the widespread adoption of ICT as a policy framework by federal and 
state governments over the past decade, Australia has remained significantly 
below the OECD average in terms of its industries’ economic contributions to 
real wealth creation (Brown, 2000; OECD, 1998; Porter, 2002, cited in James, 
2002). Brown (2000) suggests Australia’s poor performance is almost entirely 
predicated on the inability of its governments to fulfil their role within Porter’s 
ICT framework.  Brown’s (2000:13) comment that Australian governments have 
displayed a “very confused role” in their industrial policy development was 
echoed by Porter in 2002, when he stated: “Australia does not have a strategy for 
competing in the global economy, and is not doing what is necessary to get one” 
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(in James, 2002: 13).  In terms of incorporating Porter’s ICT as part of a 
definitive ‘policy role for government’, Porter himself notes that:  
…in Australia, what is less understood is that the government has some positive 
roles, like innovation and training, infrastructure, and things like that.  I think that 
the real frontier is [understanding] the positive roles to be played by government 
whilst avoiding the distortion or intervention in competition (in Trinca, 2002:39). 
 
This paper reports upon an examination of key government policy initiatives 
associated with the development of an internationally competitive shipbuilding 
industry in the regional economy of Tasmania. As part of a larger study 
concerning innovation and economic development, this paper’s focus on the 
Tasmanian state government’s role in facilitating the innovative capacity of the 
Tasmanian Light Shipbuilding industry may prove useful to policy makers in 
other regional economies. 
 
Industrial Policy Development and Australian Government Competency: A 
Review of the Literature. 
 
The history of regional economic policy development in Australia is 
characterised by the use of fads (Doeringer & Terkla, 1996, in Staber, Schaefer 
& Sharma, 1996).  In the 1960s, mature ‘smokestack’ industries were the focus 
of industrial recruitment and retention policies.  In the 1970s, the attention of 
policymakers turned to high-technology industries, and the 1980s saw the 
attraction of foreign direct investment become popular.  Given that the economic 
advantages of industrial development were well established in the literature, it is 
not surprising that Porter’s ICT was widely accepted by policymakers around the 
globe in efforts to improve both mainstream and regional economic performance 
(Feser & Bergman, 2000).  However, many examples of economic policy failure 
exist, whereby government efforts to create an ideal economic climate for 
‘industrial clustering’ have either failed outright (e.g. the Adelaide Multi-
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function Polis), or have performed far below expectations (see Doeringer & 
Terkla, 1996, in Staber, Schaefer & Sharma, 1996).   
 
Within the literature, the observed barriers to effective governmental 
implementation of Porter’s ICT as an industry policy framework have been 
attributed to four main causes.  The first has been that much of the policy 
development to date has largely been focused on information gathering rather 
than on achieving either business participation or greater understanding of the 
industrial clustering process (Davies, 2001).  The second suggests that much of 
the policy development to date has largely been based on the attempted 
replification of ‘industrial cluster policy successes’ found elsewhere (Boddy, 
2000).  The third cause suggests that although governments may have the ability 
to effectively identify working and potential industries, there is an assumption by 
policymakers that the mere provision of scarce resources will, in of itself, ensure 
an industry’s economic success.  The fourth cause relates to the simultaneous 
(and potentially incongruent) governmental adoption of macro-economic 
rationalist policies.   
 
The first major cause cited for government policy failure surrounds the 
observation that government policy development has largely been focused on 
descriptive information gathering rather than on achieving either business 
participation or greater understanding of the industrial clustering process 
(Davies, 2001).  In many of the failed IC policy developments, researchers have 
noted that government policy appears to have been based upon a lack of clear 
understanding of local and interregional industrial linkages, and the channels of 
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technology and knowledge transfer, which meant that relatively simple measures 
(such as location quotients and industry size) have often been used by 
government to detect potential growth industries in sub-national regions (Gordon 
& McCann, 2000).    
 
The second major cause sited suggests that much of the policy development to 
date has largely been based on the attempted replification of ‘industrial cluster 
policy successes’ found elsewhere (Boddy, 2000).   Of particular concern has 
been the reliance of government policymakers on a limited set of particularly 
successful technological industries such as Silicon Valley, Hong Kong’s 
financial district, Boston’s Route 128, and Cambridge in the UK.  Boddy (2000) 
suggests that there are clear dangers in simply attempting to reproduce 
significant policy direction from a relatively small number of specific cases, 
especially those whose economic success is atypical and often based on 
relationships that have developed over a considerable period within a particular 
industry.  
 
The third cause discussed concerns the government’s allocation of its scarce 
resources as a potential ineffective policy approach to industry formation.  Feser 
and Bergman (2000) note that, at least at the local level, the approach frequently 
adopted by policymakers involves little more than the identification of current 
regional specialisations as targets for traditional development initiatives.  In such 
cases, industry policy strategy serves more often as a means of allocating scarce 
resources than as a way to build the linkages and future inter-industry synergies 
documented so frequently in successful industrial districts (Feser & Bergman, 
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2000).  For example, in Australia, many ‘planned’ industry policy frameworks 
have failed to materialise despite heavy investments by government into setting 
up the infrastructure required to support emergent industries (OECD, 1998).   
 
The fourth cause has been the inadequacy of conventional approaches to 
governmental industry policy development in the face of the macroeconomic 
rationalism of the 1990s.  Important though this effort is, the policy context has 
not always encouraged the analytical clarity which is required both for empirical 
testing of the theorised industrial cluster propositions, and for assessing the broad 
scale of benefits which the various kinds of policy initiative might be expected to 
yield in different contexts (Digiovanna, 1996).  In addition, the nature of political 
will towards industrial cluster policy has also proven to be both highly 
changeable and problematic in the 1990s.  Given the relatively short terms of 
government, and the rather longer time-frame required for emergent industries to 
become established in an economy, short-term political problems and policy 
shifts can have detrimental affects on planned industry initiatives.    In Australia, 
for example, the economic recession of 1989-1993 resulted in a federal 
government policy shift away from funding state-based industrial policy projects, 
which resulted directly in the major alteration, and even abandonment of, many 
state-based industry policy initiatives in the late 1990s (see Boddy, 2000).   
 
Due to the absence of agreed-upon criteria, and the relatively ‘poor performance’ 
of Australia industry policies by OECD standards, it has been argued that 
Australian policy development has been based on largely ‘backward looking 
models’ that provide little predictive value (Ellis & Pecotich, 2002; Rajneesh, 
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1993).   Indeed, much of the literature on how Australian governments have 
constructed (or should construct) their industry policy fails to demonstrate their 
understanding of how to implement effective development policies.  Instead, 
industrial policies appear to emerge from judgements based on broad industry 
growth forecasts, untested predictions regarding the business potential of 
particular technologies, and examples of idiosyncratic industry configurations 
that have been successful elsewhere (Doeringer & Terkla, 1996, in Staber, 
Schaefer & Sharma, 1996; Rugman, 1991; Yetton et al, 1992).   
 
The Case of the Tasmanian Light Shipbuilding Industry (TLSI). 
In order to understand the positive role that an Australian government can play in 
the development of internationally competitive industries, this paper undertakes 
an examination of the 25-year history of one of Australia’s most successful 
export industries, that of the TLSI (Industry Audit, 1998).  The value of the TLSI 
to the regional Tasmanian economy is beyond question.  Since its inception in 
1977, the TLSI has grown substantially in terms of both its sales volume and 
innovative output (Industry Audit, 1998).  At its peak between 1996 and 1998, 
the TLSI generated an annual turnover of AUD$400 million in export earnings 
for the Tasmanian economy (accounting for 23 percent of the state’s 
merchandise export revenues), and employed approximately 2 500 people 
(Industry Audit, 1998).  The TLSI also boasts the world’s leading manufacturer 
of high-speed aluminium ferries, International Catamarans, which at the peak of 
the industry’s output, managed to capture 40 percent of the world’s passenger 
ferry market, simultaneously earning the status of being the regional economy’s 
largest private sector employer (Wickham & Hanson, 2002).   
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In 2005, the TLSI comprised eleven entities – International Catamarans (a 
producer of innovative fast-ferry catamarans, and the driving force behind the 
industry’s international success); Colbeck & Gunton (maritime fire protection 
equipment); APCO Engineering (a ‘cast and machined component’ 
manufacturer); Liferaft Systems (a producer of maritime safety equipment); 
Riley Industrial & Marine Sales (a marine hydraulics manufacturer); Richardson 
Devine Marine (a producer of aluminium pleasure-craft); Muir Engineering 
(winches and associated maritime machinery); FC Management (a mono-hull 
passenger ferry manufacturer); North West Bay Ships (a producer of a diverse 
range of aluminium passenger ferries); the Australian Maritime College; and the 
TAFE Aluminium Welding School (Industry Audit, 1998).   
 
Method. 
This research comprised a comprehensive series of semi-structured interviews 
with all of the key informants within the TLSI and the state government during 
the period 1977 to 2002.  Interviews were conducted with each of Tasmania’s 
state Premiers during the TLSI’s formation, the managing directors of the TLSI 
firms, and the heads of government departments and agencies with which the 
TLSI had significant interactions. In total 25 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted, each lasting between 60 and 90 minutes.  The interview questions 
posed to the participants were derived from an extensive collection and analysis 
of historical data pertaining to the TLSI’s development.  As such, the interviews 
contained both standardised interview questions (i.e. common to all informants) 
and specific interview questions (i.e. aimed at the key informants’ specific 
involvement in the TLSI’s history), and were formulated to elicit the primary 
data required to answer the research questions posed in this inquiry.   Both the 
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standardised and specific interview questions were formulated to facilitate the 
aggregation, analysis, triangulation, and validation of information, and enabled 
the researcher to interrogate the evidence gathered from other sources.  These 
questions were designed to cover the necessary issues, but were framed in an 
open-ended manner, to allow the interviewees sufficient latitude for 
introspection and open reporting of their own perspectives.  As a result, the 
informants were free to pursue those matters that they considered important.   
 
This collection of primary data using a semi-structured interview method allowed 
the informants to tell their own story in their own way, thereby allowing the 
researcher direct access to the experience of the case (Clandinin & Connelly, 
1994).  These individualised recollections aid to strengthen the inquiry by 
counteracting the bias that may exist in the secondary documents (Burgess, 
1982), by adding matters of fact or detail that may only be recorded in individual 
memory (Samuel, 1982), and by giving voice to those not usually heard (Fontana 
& Frey, 1994).  The semi-structured interviews assisted this inquiry in each of 
these areas, as they enabled the researcher to access facets of the case that would 
not have been available by any other data gathering technique.  The 
interpretation of the data, and the verification of the conclusions, were facilitated 
by the use of the QSR NUD*IST (version 6.0) software package.  In the method 
literature, it has been emphasised that computer software programs such as 
NUD*IST, are of significant value in qualitative analysis and any subsequent 
theory building (Kelle, 1995; Richards & Richards, 1995; Weitzman & Miles, 
1995).  The interview transcripts were imported into the NUD*IST software 
database, following which the categories (i.e. the coding of the data) were 
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established as a series of nodes.  These nodes formed part of an index system that 
the software depicts as a ‘stem and leaf’ system of association.    
 
One of the most prevalent concerns surrounding the reporting of longitudinal 
industrial development research concerns the evolutionary nature of the 
industrial life cycle.  Peters and Hood (2000) discuss how the industrial life cycle 
notion can influence the effectiveness of a government’s industry policy 
platform.  A growing literature base suggests that ‘who innovates’ and ‘how 
much’ innovative activity is undertaken by an industry is closely linked to the 
phase of the industry life cycle, and is of vital importance to effective policy 
implementation (Klepper, 1996).  It is therefore necessary for this research to 
highlight the longitudinal variation in government policy generation, and link 
them to the developmental needs of the TLSI over the stages of the TLSI’s life 
cycle.   
 
Discussion. 
A reflection upon the Tasmanian government’s policy initiatives during 
introductory stage of the TLSI’s life cycle (1977-1984). 
 
During the introductory stage of its life cycle, three key government roles were 
perceived to positively influence the TLSI’s development.  The first was the state 
government’s initial non-committal stance towards the specific development of 
the state’s ‘new’ shipbuilding industry.   The second role surrounded the 
enhancement of the state’s reputation within the domestic market as a centre for 
maritime research.  The third role was the government’s support for the 
entrepreneurial activities undertaken by Incat, when it became apparent that the 
company was a potential source of significant economic growth for the regional 
economy.  
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The state government’s initial non-committal stance towards the state’s ‘new’ 
industry was not deliberate, as its policy focus at the time was on the macro-
economic restructuring of the state’s economy away from its dependence on 
hydro-industrialisation:  
At the end of the Reece era [the previous state Premier of] Tasmania had 
probably exploited the industries associated with hydro-industrialisation – not 
exploited but got the best out of it – and it was a bit of a turning point then…time 
to try something totally new  (Doug Lowe. Personal Interview, 2002).   
 
Due to this focus on the macro-economic restructuring process, the state 
government did not at any stage focus on, or pre-empt the growth requirements 
of the industry. The Premier of the day recalled that:  
We didn’t perceive it as anything special.  You have come one step further than 
the actual development of policy that lead to the establishment of the 
shipbuilding industry.   The thrust of government industrial development policy 
in the mid 1970’s was really evolving from a very bureaucratised public sector 
government structure advisory secretariat seated within government, 
predominantly from people who were experienced in the public sector as distinct 
from the commercial sector itself (Doug Lowe. Personal Interview, 2002).    
 
As such, the Tasmanian government avoided the issues surrounding many of 
Australia’s industry policy failures prevalent in the 1990s in which governments 
built up the infrastructural support to potential industries in the hope that this 
would attract firms, as for example, the federal and South Australian government 
did with the failed Multi-Function Polis planned for Adelaide.  Consequently, the 
development of the innovative technologies remained the sole responsibility of 
the private sector firms that existed during the industry’s initial formation (i.e. 
the managing director of Incat and his maritime friendship network).   As stated 
by Premier Groom: 
… if government takes a too bigger role in [the private sector’s activities] that is 
fraught with huge dangers because the record of government running shows is 
not very good.  I happen to believe government needs to be there backing 
up…but the innovative process is still fundamentally a private enterprise show 
(Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002).  
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The second key role was the state government’s development of the region’s 
reputation within the broader domestic maritime market as a national centre for 
maritime research.  The Tasmanian government implemented a series of 
lobbying initiatives that resulted in the federal government providing additional 
funding to the Australian Maritime College (a federally funded training facility 
based in Launceston) and relocating its national maritime research institute (the 
CSIRO) to Hobart.  Premier Lowe said of this strategy that: 
The next step in my judgement was to make sure that we made Tasmania, as far 
as possible, a super centre for southern oceans activity and we looked specifically 
at developing ship servicing facilities, particularly in the Port of Hobart but also 
looking at the Tamar Valley in Launceston, it had developed of its own initiative 
a lift operation for smaller vessels, both for construction and for overhaul, so we 
had, at both ends of the state some great work going on (Doug Lowe. Personal 
Interview, 2002).    
 
These state government efforts were largely aimed at the federal government 
rather than the private sector, but their success had implications for the region’s 
infrastructure.  The regional economy’s infrastructures were advanced by 
developing the region’s human capital through the generation of specialised 
employment and education within the broader industry.  The regional economy’s 
supporting industries were similarly developed by the increase in the 
sophistication of supply to the private sector firms (in terms of products and 
world standard maritime research). The Tasmanian government’s enhancement 
of the region’s reputation helped to develop the demand conditions faced by the 
private sector shipbuilding firms, most significantly by increasing customer 
willingness to import their products.   In response to the exporting success of 
Incat’s catamarans in the early 1980s, the Tasmanian government undertook its 
third key role, that of accommodating the growth requirements of Incat with a 
loan guarantee for its innovative aspirations.   
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Although the Tasmanian government did provide its first direct support for 
Incat’s innovative ship designs in the introductory stage of the TLSI’s life cycle, 
it did so only after the company was able to demonstrate its commercial success 
in the domestic market for ferry transportation.  The government support for 
Incat was provided when the firm could demonstrate that it did not possess the 
resources required for its continued expansion, and then only after its 
management was able to demonstrate that significant increases in employment 
were the likely result of the support.  As the Premier of the day noted: 
I think we saw [Incat] as one opportunity amongst many– but I don’t think it was 
ever thought, “We could become a grand shipbuilding nation of the world?”  
Whatever.  I think it was – “Let’s see how if this one goes and we will get on 
with the next one then”.  We didn’t have a dream that we were going to be 
building great shipbuilder’s names.  I think the first thing was to try and support 
the fact that it was a central business and flowing from that there would be other 
offshoots of success to develop (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
 
This initial government support is consistent with the recommendation of 
Porter’s ICT, as it allows for the challenges facing the ‘new’ industry to be 
overcome whilst avoiding the inefficiencies associated with the government’s 
direct involvement in private sector enterprise.  The introductory stage of the 
TLSI’s life cycle was, therefore, characterised by the arm’s length relationship 
between the Tasmanian governments and the entrepreneurial efforts of the 
shipbuilding firms.  Indeed, reflecting on the early stages of his company’s 
development, Incat’s managing director suggested that the collision of the 
government owned Lake Illawarra with the Tasman Bridge (the event that led 
Incat to instigate its innovative ferry-building business) was the first and only 
government assistance that he received (Clifford, 1998).   
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A reflection upon the Tasmanian government’s policy initiatives during the 
growth stage of the TLSI’s life cycle (1984 – 1999). 
 
During the growth stage of its life cycle, three key state government roles were 
perceived to positively influence the development of the TLSI.  The first was the 
Tasmanian government’s continued effort to enhance the reputation of the 
regional economy, although the focus of these efforts changed from the domestic 
maritime market to one of a marketing effort in the international market for fast-
ferry vessels.  The second was the Tasmanian government’s direct involvement 
in Incat’s sales negotiations with its international customers.  The third was the 
Tasmanian government’s policy initiatives that served to maximise the 
synergistic relationship that existed between Incat and its supplier firms. 
 
The first of the state government policies that positively influenced the 
development of the TLSI was the continued enhancement of the region’s 
reputation as a centre for maritime excellence, although the policy’s focus 
changed markedly to encompass the international marketplace.  Premier Field’s 
press release at the time explained the merit of this strategy: 
The government’s strategy recognises that to be viable today, companies 
involved in ship and boat building needed to have a national and international 
perspective, and develop their operations accordingly.  We have been building 
boats in Tasmania in a regular and conventional way since 1814.  As we seek to 
establish a solid economic base for the 21st Century, nothing is more logical than 
to expand our marine industry (Field, 1989:2).    
 
This change in focus was driven by the continued success of Incat’s innovative 
product line in the domestic ferry transportation market.  Through the use of 
government sponsored trade missions and the associated negotiation activities, 
the Tasmanian government used the success of Incat to illustrate the region’s 
maritime competency to international buyers of these products, in turn 
facilitating an increase in the international demand conditions for Incat’s 
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production.  The Tasmanian government also applied pressure on the remainder 
of the TLSI firms, and indeed the region’s maritime industry as a whole, to 
similarly increase the quality of their production in line with the growing 
international reputation of the region.  Premier Groom explained the rationale for 
this policy choice: 
Obviously we saw a need to encourage any Tasmanian industry where we had 
some special advantage.   I think we are a maritime state – being an island state, 
it is particularly relevant to Tasmania and we saw this as something that had 
potential.  We sought to ensure that it wasn’t just Incat that drove the industry’s 
success, we needed ot ensure that the set of firms here were able to produce the 
sort of goods and services that the state had become renowned for (Ray Groom. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
 
The Tasmanian government helped the region’s shipbuilding and maritime 
manufacturing firms to achieve high quality production by maintaining its 
existing lobbying efforts for additional infrastructural funding for the industry.  
As Premier Rundle stated on the matter of federal government lobbying: 
We certainly put in a lot of effort on that using our Federal members and Federal 
Liberal members as well, there were direct representations made to Canberra by 
the State Government and also by our Federal Senators.  But, they were all on the 
job, there was no doubt about that, because obviously it was a very important 
industry, employing probably about 1,000 at that stage (Tony Rundle.  Personal 
Interview, 2002).  
 
Specifically, the Tasmanian government undertook political action to secure 
additional funding for the educational and research requirements of the industry.  
As with its direct support for Incat’s needs, however, the Tasmanian government 
only lobbied for additional federal government funding after its need was 
recognised by the private sector, and where the private sector firms could 
demonstrate that these needs were necessary for their future growth.  The 
Tasmanian government’s reputation enhancement strategy served to increase the 
demand conditions enjoyed by the state’s shipbuilding industry, and in particular, 
for the output of the regional industry’s innovative firm.  It also served to apply a 
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degree of pressure upon the innovative firm’s suppliers to similarly improve their 
production output in line with the growing prestige of the region. 
 
The second role undertaken by the Tasmanian government was that of direct 
support during Incat’s sales negotiations with their potential international 
customers.  This was directed by the incumbent state Premier at the time, through 
his department of economic development, most notably in the form of funding 
for international customer visits to Incat’s factory, but also by having the Premier 
accompany the potential customer during their visit.  On the issue of providing 
this form of support, the Premier commented: 
… when [Incat] was involved with the U.K. bloke, I went out for a meal with 
him, to give him some comfort, so Incat’s Managing Director could show he 
had real government support and that everything was on the level.  These 
efforts were both moral and actual support from us–which is quite important 
actually, so that other people know that the government backs them in their 
industry.    So, if there were visitors that Bob wanted to show, “Yes, the 
government is supporting me.”  We did as much as probably any state 
government could rationally do (Michael Field. Personal Interview, 2002).  
 
As a result of the state government’s policy initiative to become involved in 
Incat’s sales negotiation process, it provided a level of prestige, moral support 
and sales expertise that was otherwise beyond the ability of the innovative firm 
to provide.  Indirectly, this policy also served to highlight the supplier firms 
within the TLSI, as their inputs into Incat’s final product were also supported by 
the state government’s involvement in the sale.   As Premier Gray stated: 
Well, obviously there were down-stream benefits from the catamaran sale 
itself– even to the creation of the lifeboat technology.  We always had Incat’s 
ship as the main product we wanted to help promote, after all the dollars and 
employment were so important to the state.  But we also highlighted the ship’s 
bits and pieces, like the lifeboats and the internal finishes; they were all top 
quality and deserved mentioning (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002).  
 
By endorsing Incat as the industry’s innovative leader, the government’s policy 
also served to align the TLSI firms’ goals by pressuring all of the individual 
firms to innovate their products in line with the requirements of the innovative 
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firm.  In terms of advancing the demand conditions enjoyed by the regional 
industry, the state government’s involvement served to enhance the legitimacy of 
Incat’s innovative product to potential international customers. Premier Groom 
said of this policy initiative that: 
We obviously recognised Incat as a major business in the state with huge 
potential and we did understand that there would be other businesses that would 
be part of that success and would develop alongside Incat.  I just felt that if you 
could keep this business on the right path and do what we could to back it then 
there would be other benefits for the peripheral businesses, and indeed the state 
as a whole (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
 
The third key role undertaken by the Tasmanian government was to undertake 
measures to deliberately maximise the synergistic relationship that existed 
between Incat and its supplier firms.  Inherent to Porter’s ICT is the notion that 
within a network of firms, some forms of scale or scope economies exist through 
which the industry develops an internationally competitive advantage.  Through 
its development of marine parks and industrial councils (in which firms 
complementary to Incat’s operations can more easily interact) the Tasmanian 
government deliberately enabled the realisation of the synergies of both scale and 
scope inherent to the region’s natural industry.   As noted by Premier Rundle: 
I think it was partly due to Incat’s expertise and international recognition and 
partly because of the expertise that we had developing in training of skilled 
people and also the growing number of companies who were out there doing 
internationally competitive and technically innovative products and services.  
Colbeck & Gunton, they are a company that sells overseas; Richardson & Devine, 
they have been on the international market now for a quarter of a century or more.   
So, it was a logical bringing together of all of the expertise and skills that had 
been created over a period of probably 20 years – and they had reached a sort of 
critical mass, at a point where you really did have something to offer because 
they were companies that you could be confident in, had the expertise and there 
was a diverse range of maritime products and expertise that gave you a very 
marketable package (Tony Rundle. Personal Interview, 2002).   
 
The third state government role served to advance the relevant infrastructure by 
harnessing the synergistic relationship enjoyed by the TLSI firms in residence at 
the newly established Prince of Wales Bay marine park.  With the TLSI firms 
able to operate in close geographic proximity, the individual firms were better 
 18
able to communicate and coordinate their interrelated production and training 
activities, as well as allowing them to access the advanced and specialised (and 
expensive) infrastructure developed for the marine park.   
 
The growth stage of the TLSI’s life cycle was characterised by continued efforts 
by consecutive Tasmanian government to capitalise on the state’s growing 
reputation as a world centre for innovative shipbuilding and maritime 
production.  During the early-growth stage, the Tasmanian government’s policy 
initiatives were focused on Incat as the firm that was driving the innovations 
within the industry, creating valuable employment, and generating real economic 
growth for the state.  As an indirect result of the Tasmanian government’s 
support for Incat in the early-growth stage, there was pressure placed upon 
Incat’s supplier firms to similarly innovate their products, so that they remained 
a preferred supplier to Incat.   The pressure for Incat’s supplier firms resulted in 
the individual firms receiving both solicited and unsolicited orders from their 
own international buyers of related products, such as fireproofing equipment, 
specialised ship fittings, and personal safety devises. 
 
As with the introductory stage of the TLSI’s life cycle, the innovative drive 
within the industry remained solely with the private sector firms.  The Tasmanian 
government remained largely responsible for the development of the required 
infrastructure to accommodate the industry’s growth, and improve its reputation 
as an innovative centre of global shipbuilding.  Similarly, the Tasmanian 
government’s policy initiatives and facilitative infrastructure provision appears 
only to be provided for after the industry had recognised its necessity to support 
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future growth, and was able to demonstrate this formally to the Tasmanian 
government.   
 
A reflection upon the Tasmanian government’s policy initiatives during the 
maturity stage of the TLSI’s life cycle (1999 -). 
 
During the maturity stage of its life cycle, three key state government roles were 
perceived to positively influence the development of the TLSI.  The first key role 
was the continued enhancement of the regional economy’s reputation as a world 
centre for maritime manufacturing excellence, although the focus of its efforts 
changed from the singular promotion of Incat’s success to incorporate the 
production of the entire set of industry members, be they involved in Incat’s 
innovative shipbuilding program or otherwise.  The second role was to formalise 
the relationships that existed within the regional shipbuilding and marine 
manufacturing industries.  The third role was the Tasmanian government’s 
deliberate strategy to dilute Incat’s importance and impact upon the regional 
economy. 
 
The first key state government role was its continued enhancement of the 
regional economy’s reputation as a world centre for maritime manufacturing 
excellence. During the maturity stage however, the focus of the Tasmanian 
government’s reputation strategy in the world shipping vessel market changed 
from the singular promotion of Incat’s success to incorporate the output of the 
state’s entire industry.  The following government press release summarises the 
strategy: 
Tasmania is to be marketed as a “one stop shop” for international customers 
requiring shipbuilding services…the aim of the strategy is to jointly market 
members’ products and services to show the world that Tasmania has the 
innovative services and products for manufacturing their ships (Napier, 1998:1). 
 
 20
The Tasmanian state government was able to undertake this integrated marketing 
strategy given the success that the TLSI firms had enjoyed both individually, and 
as a network, during the growth phase.  For example, by the end of the growth 
stage of the TLSI’s development, each of the supplier firms had secured their own 
export sales independent of those associated with their alliance with Incat.  The 
functional strategies incorporated by the Tasmanian government included trade 
missions, direct involvement in the international sales negotiations process, and 
the provision of integrated marketing assistance to the industry.  The marketing 
assistance provided to the industry was specifically targeted at generating a 
consistent message for all of Tasmanian firms in the international marketplace.  
 
The second key role was to formalise the relationship between the region’s entire 
set of shipbuilders and maritime manufacturers and the state government.  After 
the Prince of Wales Bay maritime park was established by the Tasmanian 
government, the private sector firms, along with the Aluminium Welding School, 
formed the Tasmanian Maritime Network (TMN) within which the TLSI could 
better develop its communications and lobbying efforts.  After the Bacon Labor 
government’s industry audit program of 1998 was completed, the TMN was 
restructured to form an Industry Council that represented approximately 85 
percent of the region’s shipbuilding and marine manufacturing firms.  The head 
of the maritime industry council said of the strategy that: 
The Tasmanian government decided that it would be a good idea to form industry 
councils – Manufacturing Industry Councils, and a few others.   What they found 
there, through surveys and everything else, it was difficult to bring people 
together and gain commitment.  Now, what we had already, in a way, was one of 
these councils.  It had already formed by our own efforts anyway, so we were 
able to encourage the rest of industry to join in the council as a group (Terry Hall. 
Personal Interview, 2002).  
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The Tasmanian state government provided a secretariat for the council, and a 
representative for the government to attend the industry council meetings.  The 
industry council meetings sought to provide the region’s shipbuilding industry 
with a direct communications channel between the entire set of firms that 
accepted the invitation to join, and between the state government and the 
industry as a whole.  The Tasmanian government representative to the maritime 
industry council stated that: 
Our role in the industry council is to provide the secretariat.   We don’t run the 
industry council, the industry councils they run themselves, we provide 
secretarial services, that is, they produce minutes of meetings, distribute the 
minutes, they produce agenda, mail that out and we do position papers, the 
industry council tells us to go away and get some information, we do that.  For 
example, they may want to know a bit more about Workplace Health and Safety, 
so we [the Department of State Development] line a team of speakers from the 
Workplace Standards Authority who can give, we get an inspector actually 
talking about, how does it work on the ground, the head of the agency who gives 
a half hour on agency policy and so on and how they see it (John Keller. Personal 
Interview, 2002).  
 
The industry council arrangement also helped to ensure that that the set of firms 
within the industry could better incorporate the success factors of the TLSI into 
their operations, and therefore become involved in the process of further 
developing the regional industry’s ‘firm strategy structure and rivalry’ to comply 
with world-best standards.   
 
The third key role was the Tasmanian government’s strategy to dilute Incat’s 
importance and impact within the regional economy.  The policy was 
implemented through the attraction of additional innovative shipbuilding firms to 
the region (producing vessels unlike those of Incat) in the hope that the TLSI’s 
supplier firms would have alternate sources of sales opportunities incremental to 
that of Incat.  Premier Bacon indicated the rationale for this policy direction 
when he stated that: 
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One of the big problems identified with the industry at that stage was that it was 
too reliant on Incat and that having one major company does not a healthy 
[industry] make!   You’ve got everybody relying on this one company … we saw 
that as a weakness of the industry.  So, we assisted … to establish North West 
Bay Ships, we have given them considerable assistance over the four years, and 
now it is prospering and growing rapidly and winning new orders (Jim Bacon.  
Personal Interview, 2002).   
 
The Tasmanian government was able to attract additional innovative firms 
through marketing the region’s advanced infrastructure, support that was initially 
provided solely for the benefit of Incat.  Where needed, the Tasmanian 
government also provided the option to undertake an equity arrangement with the 
new firms, an arrangement that involved funding of the new firms’ relocation 
and start-up costs, but did not involve the state government intervening in the 
innovative process of the firm.  Premier Bacon illustrated this policy choice: 
So, we assisted … to establish North West Bay Ships at the Margate Park, we 
have given them considerable assistance over the four years, in terms of finding 
them land, purchasing equity, and removing barriers such as zoning issues 
etcetera.  North West are a valuable addition to the [industry], as they are in a 
different part of the market than Incat, and therefore not taking business away 
from Incat, but generating new business for the state (Jim Bacon. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
 
This policy initiative had a direct impact on the demand conditions enjoyed by 
the TLSI by effectively driving incremental demand from the international 
marketplace for region’s maritime production.  In addition, it allowed the TLSI’s 
supplier firms to develop exponentially greater linkages within the industry, and 
more importantly, with firms of similar importance as the original firm in terms 
of their innovative ability and supply requirements.   
 
The maturity stage of the TLSI’s life cycle was highlighted by the Tasmanian 
government’s efforts to further enhance the synergistic characteristics of the 
TLSI, and to extend them to the wider community of marine manufacturers.  
Interestingly, the Tasmanian government undertook significant and deliberate 
measures to ensure that the TLSI diversified away from its traditional reliance on 
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the demand generated by Incat.  In terms of reducing the TLSI’s reliance on 
Incat, the Tasmanian government undertook deliberate measures to dilute the 
firm’s importance as a generator of sales and ‘domestic demand’ for the 
remained of the TLSI’s production.  For the first time, the Tasmanian 
government undertook an equity arrangement with a similarly innovative firm 
such that the TLSI’s firms would have an increasingly diverse source of internal 
demand for their production, and perhaps more importantly, their ability to 
innovative.   
 
Implications. 
The implications for the role of state government in the effective development of 
a regional economy’s industrial policy are four-fold.  The first implication 
surrounds the state government’s initial response to the potential formation of an 
internationally competitive industry.  It is interesting that the Tasmanian 
government maintained an ‘arm’s length’ relationship during the industry’s 
formative stages, allowing the individual firms to determine the pace and 
trajectory of their innovations. In the TLSI case study, the research indicates that 
the state government’s eventual support for the emergent entrepreneurial activity 
must be commensurate with its relevance to the region’s competitive (or 
‘natural’) advantages and the likelihood of their commercial success in export 
markets. The reverse holds that state government need to be aware that 
supporting entrepreneurial activity that does not closely align with the region’s 
competitive advantages as they may be more likely to relocate their activity as 
more cost effective opportunities arise.   Premier Bacon echoes this conclusion: 
We have had some examples, back in the ‘80s, …they called it “strategy” for God 
sake, it attracted a number of growth businesses for a while, … and now most of 
them have moved to Fiji and elsewhere.  It was totally unsustainable because the 
minute another government grants a greater subsidy, they packed up and left 
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because there was no reason for them to be here other than the fact that the 
government had offered them so much money they would have been mad not to.  
It was totally unsustainable (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
 
The second implication is that the role of the government in a regional Australian 
economy is necessarily variable over the life cycle of the industry, and as a result 
must have the capability to identify and monitor the set of ‘competitive 
industries’ that exist within the region, and their stage of development.  It is also 
important for the government to avoid the adoption of a ‘one size fits all’ policy 
regime for its set of industries, as each will have its own requirements given their 
own particular stage of development.  Central to this point is the need for 
government to be able to recognise the existing and potential synergies that exist 
within an industry, and therefore be better able to aid the optimisation of this 
idiosyncratic relationship.   
 
The third implication of this research is that the regional government must 
provide the required infrastructural needs of the developing industry, however, 
the manner of its provision is clearly demonstrated by the Tasmanian 
government in this case.  Firstly, the needs of the industry were never pre-empted 
by the government.  Instead, the government awaited a claim from the private 
sector firms, usually in the form of a business proposal, with demonstrable 
evidence that without its provision growth and employment within the industry 
would decline.  
 
 The fourth implication is the need for the government to actively dilute the 
importance of the original innovative firm to the regional economy as the 
sophistication of its supplier firms similarly advances.  It appears necessary to 
safeguard the innovative firm’s suppliers (and indeed the region’s entire set of 
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industry members) against reliance upon one major entity for their sales growth.  
Possible methods to achieve this end include the introduction of new firms to the 
region such that they can benefit from the advanced infrastructure that exist there 
(creating a set of innovative firms for the supplier firms to interact with), and to 
apply a positive influence upon these firms to take steps in securing their own 
discrete export sales. 
   
Conclusion. 
This research contributes a fine-grained reflection of the Tasmanian 
government’s policy initiatives by those that implemented them. The success of 
the Tasmanian government in building the TLSI suggests that governments 
should attempt to encourage activities that fit a region’s social and economic 
strengths even when, as in the Tasmanian case, these strengths are subtle. The 
need to vary the type and strength of government assistance as the industry 
developed was also emphasised (for example by providing training only after 
needs had become apparent and could be specifically targeted). Finally, the 
government was able to change the focus of assistance over time, broadening it 
to include new industry members as they emerged. Overall, the TLSI presents an 
object lesson in the advantages of careful government assistance that avoided the 
perils of taking actions that distorted competition in the nascent industry. 
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